In 1997, a new center-right government came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to accelerate market reforms. By the time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP was produced in the private sector, compared to 45 percent in 1996. The government however lost the elections. This paper uses unique survey data to examine whether the high unemployment associated with market reform contributed to the election outcome. High unemployment did have an effect but it was small and does not explain the election loss. In fact, many in the population, including the unemployed, believed that high unemployment was the necessary price for future prosperity. In 1997, a new center-right government came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to accelerate market reforms. By the time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP was produced in the private sector, compared to 45 percent in 1996. The government however lost the elections. This paper uses unique survey data to examine whether the high unemployment associated with market reform contributed to the election outcome. High unemployment did have an effect but it was small and does not explain the election loss. In fact, many in the population, including the unemployed, believed that high unemployment was the necessary price for future prosperity.
I.
Introduction.
In most cases, the benefits of economic reforms in transition economies have not accrued instantaneously. Cutting public subsidies, privatization, and closing down inefficient state firms are expected to produce output and employment growth in the long-run but the initial effect is high unemployment. All transition economies experienced rapid growth in unemployment at the start of reforms, in many cases from zero to double digits within a few years. The unemployed generally personify the losers of the transition process. The literature has devoted significant attention to the political implications of this delay in benefits. Would the unemployed demand from political leaders a slowdown of reforms, more public subsidies and more protection? Would they vote against further reform? If so, reforms may need to be implemented gradually and should be sequenced so that there are clearly recognizable gains before the next step is taken (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992) . Alternatively, Rodrik (1995) argues that the unemployed may demand even faster reforms recognizing that the completion of reforms is the only long-term solution to unemployment. How the unemployed vote therefore has important implications for the sustainability of reforms.
Empirical findings from developed economies suggest that unemployment and inflation are the "big two" reasons (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) for loss of political support. Governments are penalized for negative current economic conditions. For the transition economies, Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) write that, "The unemployment crisis in the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries has contributed to a political 2 backlash as disenchanted voters often ousted the first reform governments after a few years." Yet, despite the high unemployment, reforms have generally marched forward in the transition economies. Warner (2001) finds that reforms in Russia have generated more rather than less support for further reforms. Fidrmuc (2000) also concludes that "instead of punishing or rewarding the government for economic performance, the elections in the transition countries serve as referenda on the speed of reforms, and the overall reform strategy." One possible way to explain the lack of strong opposition to reforms is that the public views the high unemployment associated with the structural adjustments as a temporary and necessary cost for future economic gains in the country.
If so, the negative impact of high unemployment on political support for reforms may be smaller compared to a case where high unemployment is not perceived to have any purpose. The literature studying voting in developed economies has generally dismissed the existence of such highly informed forward-looking component in voters' behavior but the conditions in transition economies may be different because of the massive transformation. This paper uses survey data from Bulgaria to explore those ideas. The survey data reveal however that unemployment did not contribute to the growth in political opposition in significant ways. The unemployed did not become political opponent to the government is large numbers. What is more, in places with very high and persistent unemployment, the unemployed were more rather than less likely to support UDF. In addition, the data show that, at the height of unemployment, almost half of the population believed that unemployment was the necessary short-term cost of reforms. In fact, a significant proportion of the unemployed agents believed in that. These beliefs translated into additional votes for UDF.
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The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides unique evidence on public beliefs regarding the necessity of short-term costs in the transition process and their impact on the political support for reform. The results suggest that in addition to keeping unemployment as low as possible (something achieved in the Czech
Republic; see Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell, 1998) , sequencing reforms to build supportive constituency, and providing compensatory payments, it is important and possible to convince at least part of the public that sacrifices are necessary in order to sustain political support for reform. Effective communication of current policies and their impact is therefore essential. Such effect has not been explicitly included in theoretical models.
Second, the paper highlights the effect of perceived permanence and irreversibility in reforms on the support for reform. After years of delay in tough reforms, by 1997 it was clear that policy reversals, which were characteristic in the early years of transition in Bulgaria, would lead only to deterioration of economic conditions. Rapid privatization and enterprise liquidation along with introducing a currency board increased the credibility of the government that reforms would be permanent. The experience therefore supports the notion that "ex ante hostility to reform and ex post support are quite consistent with each other." (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) Third, the paper also complements earlier research on reform and voting in transition economies which has used aggregate country or regional data (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2000 and Warner, 2001 ) by studying voting on the individual level. For each individual, the survey shows which party she/he voted for in 1997 (when UDF came to power) and which party she/he intended to vote for after much of the reform package had been implemented and unemployment had increased. That makes it possible to test whether the employment status of individuals or/and their views on the reforms contributed to the rapid decline in political support for UDF. As the survey is nationally representative, it matches voting behavior very closely. Holding constant earlier voting behavior is important in transition economies to capture ideological differences in the population which tend to be strong.
Finally, the survey data make it possible to differentiate the effects of unemployment on voting for various groups of unemployed and to test the proposition of Rodrik (1995) that the unemployed may demand more rather than less reforms. The 4 results show that in rural areas where unemployment has been higher and with longer duration, the political support for UDF was stronger rather than weaker among the unemployed. The unemployed are therefore a heterogeneous group and the political support for reforms among them vary with differences in circumstances. In the theoretical literature, the unemployed are generally considered a homogenous group opposed to reform.
The next section discusses in brief some major economic developments in Bulgaria over the last few years. The sections following that present the data and report empirical results. Section VII concludes with final remarks.
II. Delayed market reform in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria has generally been one of the laggards in the transition process in
Eastern Europe, at least until UDF accelerated reforms in 1997. According to the EBRD (1998), between 1992 and 1997, only 20 percent of total enterprise assets were privatized.
In the early years of transition, loss-making enterprises were allowed to operate on soft budget constraints which lead to continued drain on tax money, large budget deficits, and deteriorating credit portfolios of commercial banks. Governments changed almost each year. According to Aslund (2002, p. 385 ) the experience of Bulgaria illustrates the danger of "patently inconsistent policies and erratic policy reversals" where "vested interests have been a far greater threat to sound economic policies in transition than disorder".
Bulgaria fits well the model advanced by Hellman (1998) where reforms were kept "partial" under the influence of vested interests who managed to extract large rents in a semi-market environment.
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The delay in reforms contributed to large budget deficits and rising public debt ( A very important part of the reforms was the introduction of a currency board.
The currency board not only provided a nominal anchor by fixing the domestic currency to the German mark and lowering inflation, but it also made it impossible for the government to finance budget defects by money creation. 2 That was a strong impetus to put public finances in order which in turn provided an incentive to the government to reduce subsidies and liquidate or privatize firms. In essence, maintaining a credible currency board required structural reform. The large political costs associated with abandoning the currency board implied that the cost of reversal of structural reforms was also high which raised the credibility of the government's commitment to complete the reforms.
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As Table 1 shows, with the introduction of the currency board inflation declined very rapidly into single digits and has remained low since 1997. Stable prices, privatization, increased competition in financial markets, and opening the economy 2 A currency board is a fixed exchange rate regime with the additional provision that the central bank maintains foreign exchange reserves that are sufficiently large to cover the monetary base. The currency is fully convertible. The currency board removes discretion over monetary policy; changes in money supply are linked to the balance of payments with balance payments deficits leading to monetary contraction and balance of payments surpluses leading to monetary expansion. See Schwartz (1993) and Carlson and Valev (2001) .
6 contributed to growing investment levels and higher growth rates (Table 1) . For the first time since the beginning of transition Bulgaria experienced sustained positive economic growth. Nevertheless, the effect on employment over the initial years was small and the positive growth was not sufficient to compensate for the loss of jobs. By 2000 official unemployment had increased to 17.9 percent compared to 12.5 percent in 1996 and unofficial statistics suggested an even higher rate.
Along with enterprise liquidation in 1998 UDF adopted the Unemployment Security and Employment Incentives Act. The Act reformed the unemployment benefits system reducing somewhat the generosity of benefits and strengthening incentives for reentry into the labor market. It also introduced a number of initiatives designed to facilitate job search and retraining. In general, the reform was intended to encourage the transition of workers between jobs rather than provide generous compensatory payments.
That is interesting because political economy models on economic reform generally envision a need for compensatory payments as a way of reducing individual uncertainty and maintaining the political support for reforms (see Roland, 2002 , for a discussion).
It should be pointed out that privatization and enterprise liquidation were not the only reasons for high unemployment. The World Bank (2001, p. 79) concludes that "the adverse labor market experience in Bulgaria has been linked not only to fast labor shedding, but also to a chronic inability to create jobs." The inability of the private sectors to create jobs was in turn explained by an array of factors such as policy uncertainty, administrative burdens, and lack of credit. External factors also played a role.
The war in Kosovo and the financial crisis in Russia in 1998 lead to a decline in exports.
The international financial crises in Russia and elsewhere in the late 1990's might also have depressed the inflow of foreign direct investment. High unemployment is the price we have to pay for future prosperity.
The survey asked about respondents' employment status and included questions on demographic characteristics -age, education, gender, income, and place of residence.
In the survey, 28.95 percent of the individuals in the labor force (the unemployed plus the employed) reported that they were unemployed. The unemployment rate reported in the survey is higher than the official and reflects the view that official unemployment does not capture the magnitude of the problem. predicted by the survey were also close to the actual outcomes. The big addition in 2001
was Coalition Simeon. In general, the survey does a reasonably good job matching the actual results. Most importantly, it reflects the withdrawal of political support for UDF between the two elections which is the focus of this paper.
Using the survey data, we can determine whether the withdrawal of political support from UDF was influenced by the employment status of an individual and his or her views on the reform. Before we examine the effect on voting, however, the next section discusses the public views on reform. Did Bulgarians believe in the tradeoff between short-term costs and long-term gains?
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IV.
Views on the necessity of the cost of market reform. percent is a large number because similar data are not available from other countries.
Nevertheless, it is interesting that a large part of the population perceived a purpose for the high unemployment despite the very high unemployment. These results suggest that the growth in political opposition to reform produced by personal experiences at the micro level (unemployment) may be ameliorated to some extent by an understanding of how that personal experience fits in the macro-level dynamics of the economy. In that sense, from a policy perspective, to sustain reform it is important how effectively the government communicates that a period of high unemployment is unavoidable as much as how successful it is in trying to minimize the level of unemployment. The data from Bulgaria show that the message of short-term costs for the purpose of long-term gains is likely to get through to the public even when personal experiences at the individual level are negative.
To explore how the views regarding the statement differ across various segments of the population, Table 4 reports the estimates of a probit equation where the likelihood that an agent agrees or strongly agrees with the necessity of high unemployment is explained by their employment status and several demographic characteristics: education, age, gender, income, and place of residency. Views on the cost of reforms may differ across agents because of better information (e.g. more versus less education) or because of different personal experiences.
Agents with more education were more likely to state that unemployment was a necessary short-term cost. This result may reflect a better understanding by the more educated about the tradeoffs between the short-term and the long-term involved in the process of market reform. The result may also be explained by the generally easier market experience of more educated agents during transition. The World Bank (2001) reports that the unemployment rate for individuals with higher education was around 5 percent throughout the 1990's which is more than two times lower than the unemployment rate for the population at large. We begin by looking at some summary statistics. Table 7 . Table 7 reports the marginal effects so that the coefficients can be interpreted as a direct influence on the probability of voting for UDF evaluated at the mean of the respective independent variable. In the case of dummy variables used as independent variables, the reported coefficient estimate equals the probability of voting for UDF if that dummy variable is one minus the probability of voting for UDF if it is zero. For example, the coefficient 0.389 on voting for UDF in 1997 means that, controlling for other effects, the probability of voting for UDF in 2001 was 38.9 percentage points higher for an agent who voted for UDF in 1997 compared to an agent who did not vote for UDF in 1997.
The first two columns in Table 7 report estimates using the whole sample.
Similarly to the results in Table 6 , unemployed individuals and those that did not consider unemployment to be a necessary cost of reforms were less likely to vote for UDF. This result holds after controlling for their voting in 1997 and for demographics. The results show two additional interesting effects. Individuals with more education were more likely to vote for UDF. As pointed out earlier, these agents had less dramatic experience in terms of unemployment during the reforms. Not only was unemployment among the university graduates lowest throughout the transition but it also declined between 1998 and 1999, the years of most intense reforms. These agents were therefore willing to support current policies. Table 7 also shows that female agents were less likely to support UDF. That may also be related to labor market experiences during transition. According to the World Bank (2001, p. 80) one of the features of the rapid decline in employment rates in Bulgaria has been the massive "dis-employment of women."
VI. A differential effect of unemployment on voting.
The results reported in the previous section suggest that, although the size of the effect is not large, personal experiences with unemployment in Bulgaria contributed to the growth in political opposition. The evidence therefore does not lend support to the idea advanced by Rodrik (1995) that the unemployed perceive the completion of market reforms as the only long-term solution to their problem and would therefore vote for more rather than less reform. That however may not be the complete story. The experience with unemployment has not been the same across social groups and regions in the country. Unemployment for example has been much higher in rural areas compared to cities. In many of those localities, a single larger employer had been liquidated during the transition process and the percent long-term unemployed is higher compared to cities where unemployment has been lower. For the country overall the long-term unemployed,
i.e. agents who are unemployed for at least 12 months, are approximately 50 percent of the unemployed which is higher than in many other transition economies (see Boeri and Terrell 2002) . Is it possible that, as Rodrik (1995) suggests, unemployment would increase rather than decrease the support for reform in localities where the labor market has been stagnant? For these workers, after years of failed incomplete reforms, the solution may be associated with growth in private sector employment as opposed to continued state intervention.
Another interesting variable is age. Unemployment among older workers has been lower compared to younger workers as many of them have maintained employment in state firms that still operated or were privatized rather than liquidated. Younger individuals have experienced higher unemployment even though they may be better suited (through more recent education, for example) to find employment in the newly expanding sectors of the economy such as the technology sector or services. The high unemployment among young individuals reflects the inability of the private sector to create jobs. For those individuals, as for the unemployed in more rural areas, the solution may be more rather than less market reform. To explore those ideas, we interact the dummy variable for unemployment with place of residency and age and include the interaction terms in the probit equation which explains voting in 2001. The equations were estimated only with the sample of voters who voted for UDF in 1997 to examine directly the reasons for loss of support for UDF. These estimations produced stronger results compared to equations using the full sample.
The first column of results reported in Table 8 show that while the coefficient on unemployment is negative and significant as in Table 7 , the interaction variable of unemployment and rural residence is positive and statistically significant. In addition, the size of the coefficient on the interaction variable is greater than the coefficient on unemployment and the difference is statistically significant. These results suggest that unemployment in rural areas actually contributed to stronger support for UDF while in urban areas it contributed to political opposition, which lends some support to Rodrik (1995) . The interaction variable with age did not produce statistically significant results.
VII. Final remarks.
This paper examines the loss of political support for a "reformist" party in the 2001 elections in Bulgaria. At those elections, the party that had come to power four years ago and implemented market reforms was defeated. The paper uses data from a national consumer survey to examine whether the election defeat can be explained by the (Hellman, 1998) . While that can be attributed to some external pressure to continue reforms, the evidence presented here
shows that the internal resistance to reform was not strong. The unemployed who are generally considered the losers of market reforms did not become political opponents of the reformist party. The election loss of the reformist party cannot be interpreted as a vote against reform.
A potential reason for that outcome is the high degree of irreversibility in reforms produced by their rapid implementation and the introduction of the currency board. While it may make sense for state workers to oppose proposed liquidation of inefficient state firms while the firms still operate, it does not make much sense to oppose further reform once inefficient firms have been closed for good. At that point, the solution requires further reform rather than stalling reforms. In that sense, the results highlight the difference between opposition to the initiation of reforms (ex-ante opposition) and opposition to sustaining the reform (ex-post opposition Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1, (5, 10) percent level. 
